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The Effect of Governance Mechanisms on the Quality of Risk Disclosure: Using Bootstrap Technique

American Journal of Finance and Accounting • 2014
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Publication Information
Authors Gehan A. Mousa and Elsayed A.H. Elamir
Keywords corporate risk disclosure; corporate governance mechanisms; quality of risk disclosure; bootstrap techniques.
Journal American Journal of Finance and Accounting
Publisher Not Available
Volume Vol.3
Issue No.2/4
Pages 128-151.
publication.type International
Paper Link Not Available
Supplementary Materials Not Available
Abstract
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of six corporate governance mechanisms (institutional investors, foreign investors, major
investors, debt ratio, board size and board composition) on the quality of
corporate risk disclosure. The study uses a sample of listed firms in the
Bahraini capital market and applies bootstrap techniques as a new method of
statistical analysis. The findings show that institutional investors and major
investors have a significant and positive effect on the quality of corporate risk
disclosure. However, board size is found to have a significant and negative effect on corporate risk disclosure. Foreign investors, board composition and debt ratio are insignificant in relation to risk disclosure. The study suggests that the bootstrap techniques are a useful tool for the purpose of approximating the
sampling distribution of a statistical analysis for which the sample size is small and offers a considerable potential for modelling in complex problems.